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Notes 
MICHIGAN v. BRYANT: RETURNING TO AN OPEN-ENDED 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
SHARI H. SILVER* 
 
In Michigan v. Bryant,1 the United States Supreme Court consi-
dered whether a victim’s statements to police—made shortly after the 
officers found the victim with a mortal gunshot wound—were admiss-
ible under the Confrontation Clause2 of the Sixth Amendment.3  The 
Court held that the primary purpose of the police interrogation of 
the victim was to respond to an ongoing emergency in which an 
armed shooter was at large.4  Based on this determination, the Court 
concluded that the victim’s statements to the police were nontesti-
monial5 and, therefore, did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.6
The Court’s combined focus on the intent of the declarant and 
the motives of the police to categorize the victim’s statements as non-
testimonial was a predictable result of the incomplete and contradic-
tory directives provided by Crawford v. Washington
   
7 and Davis v. Wash-
ington.8
 
Copyright © 2012 by Shari H. Silver. 
  Despite an earlier rejection of open-ended Confrontation 
Clause analysis, the Court’s combined focus on the declarant and the 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A. 
2010, Vassar College.  The author expresses special gratitude to Judge Paul W. Grimm and 
Molly K. Madden, Notes and Comments Editor, for their invaluable advice throughout the 
development of this Note.  She would also like to thank Abigail Baird, an unsurpassed 
teacher and friend, for her guidance and encouragement.  Finally, the author is thankful 
for her parents, Penny and Jeffrey Silver, who are unfailingly supportive and whose hard 
work and dedication are a model for all that she does. 
 1. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Confrontation Clause guarantees that “[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”  Id.          
 3. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150.  
 4. Id. at 1166–67. 
 5. See infra Part II.A.2–3. 
 6. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167.  
 7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 8. 547 U.S. 813 (2006); see infra Part IV.A. 
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police promotes a discretionary standard that enables virtually any re-
sult on a given set of facts and fails to adequately safeguard defen-
dants’ rights to confrontation.9  Rather than develop a combined fo-
cus on the declarant and the officers, the Court should have created a 
declarant-focused approach that limits discretionary analysis and pro-
tects defendants’ rights to confront the witnesses against them.10
I.  THE CASE 
 
On April 29, 2001, Michigan police responded to a radio dis-
patch stating that a man had been shot.11  Shortly thereafter the po-
lice found the victim, Anthony Covington, lying in the parking lot of a 
gas station and suffering from a fatal gunshot wound to his abdo-
men.12  The officers asked Covington “what had happened, who had 
shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.”13  Covington named 
“Rick” as the shooter, provided a physical description of him, and 
identified the rear of Rick’s house as the location of the shooting.14  
Covington further explained that he had been shot through the 
closed back door and that he had escaped by driving himself six 
blocks to the gas station.15  Covington died within hours after he was 
transported to the hospital.16
The officers proceeded to Richard “Rick” Bryant’s house.
 
17  The 
police found Covington’s wallet and identification outside of Bryant’s 
house as well as blood on the back porch.18
 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
  In addition, the police 
discovered a bullet on the rear porch and a bullet hole in the back 
 10. See infra Part IV.C.  This Note will refer to the examination of an interrogation’s 
primary purpose from the perspective of the declarant as the “declarant-focused ap-
proach.” 
 11. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 12. Id.  The 2009 decision did not use the victim’s name, but an earlier decision did.  
See People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) 
(per curiam), rev’d, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 13. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 71. 
 14. Id. at 67 & n.1.  Covington’s brother testified that Rick sold drugs from the back 
door of Rick’s house.  Id. at 67.  The brother also testified that the day before the shooting 
Covington had told him that he planned to redeem from Rick a coat pawned earlier in 
exchange for drugs.  Id. 
 15. Id.  Covington asserted that he knew Rick was his attacker even though he did not 
see Rick shoot him.  Id.  Covington explained that he, prior to the shooting, had a short 
conversation with Rick through the door and that he recognized Rick by the sound of his 
voice.  Id.     
 16. Id.  Covington, prior to being taken to the hospital, repeatedly asked the police 
when emergency medical services would arrive on scene.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165. 
 17. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67. 
 18. Id. 
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door.19  Bryant was not at home when the police arrived and was not 
arrested until one year later.20
At Bryant’s trial, the Wayne County Circuit Court admitted, as 
excited utterances,
 
21 the statements Covington made to the police.22  
The jury was unable to reach a decision.23  In Bryant’s second trial, 
the jury convicted him of second-degree murder, possession of a fire-
arm by a felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of 
a felony.24
Bryant appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that 
the admission of Covington’s statements violated his right to confron-
tation under the Sixth Amendment.
   
25  The court of appeals affirmed 
Bryant’s convictions on the grounds that Covington’s statements were 
nontestimonial and therefore beyond the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause.26  Bryant appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.27  As 
Bryant’s appeal before the Michigan Supreme Court was pending,28 
the United States Supreme Court decided Davis v. Washington, which 
provided further guidance on determining statement admissibility 
under the Confrontation Clause.29  The Michigan Supreme Court 
remanded Bryant’s case, ordering the court of appeals to reconsider 
Bryant’s claim in light of Davis.30
The court of appeals decided that the primary purpose of the po-
lice interrogation of Covington was to respond to an ongoing emer-
gency.
   
31  Based on this determination, the court affirmed Bryant’s 
convictions and concluded that Covington’s statements to the police 
were admissible because they were nontestimonial.32
 
 19. Id. 
   
 20. Id.  Bryant was arrested in California and then extradited to Michigan.  Id.  
 21. For an explanation of the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay 
evidence, see infra note 56. 
 22. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 
2004) (per curiam), rev’d, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 23. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67. 
 24. Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661, at *1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. People v. Bryant, 722 N.W.2d 797, 797 (Mich. 2006), remanded to No. 02-005508, 
2007 WL 675471 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007) (per curiam), rev’d, 768 N.W.2d 65 (Mich. 
2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
 28. Id. 
 29. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 30. Bryant, 722 N.W.2d at 797. 
 31. Bryant, 2007 WL 675471, at *3. 
 32. Id. 
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Bryant appealed once more to the Michigan Supreme Court, and 
the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.33  The Michigan Su-
preme Court determined that the primary purpose of the police in-
terrogation was to obtain information relevant for a later criminal 
prosecution.34  Accordingly, the court concluded that the victim’s 
statements to the police were testimonial and that admitting the 
statements violated Bryant’s right to confrontation.35  The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Coving-
ton’s statements were admissible under the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment.36
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
In recent years, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has under-
gone a transformation in which the United States Supreme Court 
sought to reduce open-ended analysis and guarantee defendants’ 
rights to confront the witnesses against them.37
A.  The United States Supreme Court Attempted to Abandon Its 
Discretionary Approach to Confrontation Clause Analysis by Creating 
a Categorical Standard 
  Part II.A of this Note 
discusses how the jurisprudence evolved from a reliance on discretio-
nary evaluations of a statement’s reliability to the employment of a ca-
tegorical approach in deciding whether a statement is admissible at 
trial.  Part II.B explains how, despite the Court’s attempts to stream-
line Confrontation Clause analysis, state and lower federal courts con-
tinue to exercise considerable discretion and reach unpredictable de-
cisions regarding the confrontation right. 
The Court has long emphasized the importance of the rights af-
forded by the Confrontation Clause, while still recognizing that cer-
tain situations justify dispensing with these rights.38
 
 33. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
  Initially, the 
Court employed hearsay rules and broad determinations of reliability 
to decide admissibility of statements made by witnesses who were un-
 34. Id. at 73. 
 35. Id. at 79.  This conclusion was reached over two dissenting opinions that deter-
mined the primary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to meet an ongo-
ing emergency.  See id. (Weaver, J., dissenting); see also id. (Corrigan, J., dissenting).    
 36. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1152. 
 37. See infra Part II.A. 
 38. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895). 
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available for trial.39  The Court later criticized this approach as discre-
tionary and without adequate protection for defendants’ confronta-
tion rights and developed a categorical approach in which courts are 
to classify statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial.40  The 
Court provided conflicting messages, however, on whether, when ap-
plying the categorical analysis, the declarant’s perspective controls, 
thereby undermining the Court’s efforts to reduce inconsistency in 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.41
1.  The United States Supreme Court Initially Utilized Open-Ended 
Tests to Determine Whether a Statement Was Reliable and 
Therefore Admissible Under the Confrontation Clause 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”42  Three cases illustrate the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s early understanding of this language: Mattox v. Unit-
ed States,43 Dutton v. Evans,44 and Ohio v. Roberts.45  In Mattox, the Court 
explained the importance of the confrontation right, yet stated that, 
under certain situations, this right should yield to considerations of 
public policy.46  The Mattox Court suggested that statements falling 
within the hearsay exception of dying declarations may be admissible 
in the absence of confrontation.47  Then, in Dutton, the Court demon-
strated how the right to confrontation may also be dispensed with 
when statements bear sufficient “indicia of reliability.”48  Finally, in 
Roberts, the Court consolidated the reasoning of the above two cases 
by articulating a reliability test for statement admissibility under the 
Confrontation Clause.49
 
 39. See infra Part II.A.1.  For a definition of hearsay rules, see note 
 
56.  For a descrip-
tion of when a witness is unavailable, see note 67. 
 40. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 41. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment is made binding on the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
 43. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 44. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
 45. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 46. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43. 
 47. Id. at 243–44. 
 48. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. 
 49. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
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Mattox was the first case in which the Court highlighted the signi-
ficance of the Confrontation Clause.50  The Court explained that the 
Confrontation Clause was intended to prevent the use of ex parte ex-
aminations of witnesses as evidence against the defendant and to pro-
tect the defendant’s opportunity for cross-examination.51  The proce-
dural guarantees provided by the Sixth Amendment ensure not only 
that the defendant has the opportunity “of testing the recollection 
and sifting the conscience of the witness,” but also that the witness is 
“compell[ed] . . . to stand face to face with the jury in order that they 
may . . . judge . . . whether he is worthy of belief.”52
Despite the importance of the rights afforded by the Confronta-
tion Clause, the Mattox Court acknowledged that public policy con-
siderations might justify dispensing with these rights.
 
53  The Court 
recognized that chief among these public policy considerations was 
fairness.54  The Court reasoned that there were situations where it 
would not be just for a defendant to “go scot free” merely because a 
witness was not available for trial.55
Seeking to accommodate this public policy interest, the Mattox 
Court implied that certain hearsay exceptions
   
56 were admissible un-
der the Confrontation Clause.57  For instance, in the Court’s view, the 
admission of dying declarations aided in the administration of justice 
by ensuring that a defendant did not avoid conviction simply because 
a witness had died and could not provide testimony at trial.58
 
 50. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43 (“There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused 
should never lose the benefit of any of [the] safeguards [provided by the Confrontation 
Clause] . . . .”). 
  Ac-
knowledging that dying declarations are typically made outside the 
 51. Id. at 242. 
 52. Id. at 242–43. 
 53. See id. at 243 (stating that the right to confrontation “must occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy”). 
 54. See id. at 243–44 (asserting that exceptions should be made to the constitutional 
requirement of confrontation “to prevent a manifest failure of justice”).  
 55. Id. at 243.   
 56. Hearsay refers to “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testify-
ing at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  
FED R. EVID. 801(c).  Generally, hearsay is not admissible at trial.  FED. R. EVID. 802.  How-
ever, as the Court has noted, hearsay law is “riddled with exceptions.”  Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 62 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  See, e.g., FED. 
R. EVID. 803(2) (stating that “excited utterances,” or “statement[s] relating to a startling 
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event of condition,” are admissible despite the general ban against hearsay evidence). 
 57. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44 (arguing that the admission of evidence under the 
dying declarations hearsay exception comported with the Confrontation Clause). 
 58. Id. at 243. 
SilverFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  9:56 AM 
2012] MICHIGAN v. BRYANT 551 
defendant’s presence and do not offer an opportunity for cross-
examination, the Court nevertheless asserted that these statements 
may be deemed truthful even without the scrutiny of confrontation.59  
The Court reasoned that a witness’s “impending death is presumed to 
remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adhe-
rence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.”60  Thus, in the 
Court’s view, confrontation was unnecessary to ensure that a dying 
witness provided honest statements, and the Court concluded that dy-
ing declarations may be admitted at trial.61
Similarly, in Dutton v. Evans, the Court suggested that admitting 
statements within the coconspirator hearsay exception
  
62 furthered the 
administration of justice by ensuring the admission of truthful state-
ments.63  The Court explained that because the coconspirator’s 
statements were made spontaneously and were against the coconspi-
rator’s interests, they bore “indicia of reliability.”64  Implying that con-
frontation was therefore unnecessary to ensure the witness’s honesty, 
the Court concluded that the coconspirator’s statements were admiss-
ible at trial.65
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court consolidated the reasoning of Mattox 
and Dutton by developing a reliability test for statement admissibility 
under the Confrontation Clause.
  
66  The Roberts Court explained that 
statements made by witnesses not present at trial are admissible under 
two conditions: (1) when the witnesses are unavailable67 and (2) when 
the statements are reliable.68
 
 59. Id. at 243–44. 
  The Court further elaborated that a 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  
 62. The coconspirator hearsay exception refers to out-of-court statements made by a 
defendant’s fellow conspirator while “in the course of and in furtherance of the conspira-
cy.”  Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970).  In Dutton, the state evidentiary rule at issue 
included within this exception statements made by the coconspirator during a period of 
concealing the criminal activity.  Id.  
 63. See id. at 89 (asserting that the coconspirator’s statements should be admitted be-
cause there was no reason to suspect that the coconspirator had lied). 
 64. Id.  The defendant’s coconspirator was a man who, along with the defendant and 
one other man, attacked and murdered three police officers.  Id. at 76–77.  The statements 
at issue were made by the coconspirator to a fellow prisoner.  Id. at 77. 
 65. See id. at 89 (stating that the objective of the Confrontation Clause is to guarantee 
the truthfulness of witnesses’ statements and that this objective was accomplished in the 
case at bar by the demonstration of certain “indicia of reliability”). 
 66. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 67. A witness is unavailable when, despite good faith efforts made by the prosecution, 
the witness cannot be made to appear at trial.  Id. at 74 (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 
719, 724–25 (1968)). 
 68. Id. at 66.   
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statement is reliable when it falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay ex-
ception,” such as dying declarations, or is supported by “particula-
rized guarantees of trustworthiness,” such as statements by a cocons-
pirator.69  The Court reasoned that its earlier cases reflect the view 
that, so long as statements made by unavailable witnesses are reliable, 
they need not be subject to confrontation.70
2.  The United States Supreme Court Later Rejected the Reliability Test 
and Developed a Categorical Standard of Confrontation Clause 
Analysis  
  The Court therefore de-
veloped an open-ended standard of Confrontation Clause analysis in 
which courts are to determine statement reliability.  
Twenty-five years after Roberts, in Crawford v. Washington, the 
Court criticized the reliability test as “replacing categorical constitu-
tional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests.”71  In doing so, the 
Crawford Court identified major issues related to the reliability test of 
Roberts.  First, the Court argued that basing statement admissibility on 
hearsay rules led to abuse of defendants’ rights because, as the rules 
of evidence change over time, so does the admissibility of statements 
under the Confrontation Clause.72  Second, the Court asserted that, 
by allowing courts wide discretion to decide the reliability of evidence, 
a defendant’s right to confrontation was vulnerable to judicial over-
ride.73  In the Court’s belief, the “[v]ague standards” provided by the 
reliability test were “manipulable” and left the enforcement of defen-
dants’ confrontation rights to the whims of courts.74
Seeking to address the issues of the reliability test, the Court de-
veloped a categorical approach by basing the admissibility of state-
ments on whether they are testimonial or nontestimonial.
 
75
 
 69. Id.   
  The 
Court explained that testimonial statements made by a witness who 
did not testify at trial are admissible under the Confrontation Clause 
only when (1) the witness is unavailable for trial and (2) the defen-
 70. Id.  
 71. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68.  Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in this pioneering 
decision.  Id. at 38. 
 72. Id. at 50–51 (“Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evi-
dence would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant 
inquisitorial practices.”). 
 73. Id. at 67–68. 
 74. Id. at 68. 
 75. Id. 
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dant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.76  By contrast, 
nontestimonial statements made by a witness who did not testify at tri-
al are admissible when states allow this evidence under their hearsay 
law.77
The Court’s focus on whether statements are testimonial 
stemmed from the text of the Confrontation Clause, which speaks of 
“witnesses” against the accused.
   
78 Witnesses, according to the Court, 
are “those who ‘bear testimony.’”79  Although it defined “testimony” as 
“[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of estab-
lishing or proving some fact,” the Court declined to provide a com-
prehensive definition of the term “testimonial.”80  Instead, the Court 
merely stated that, “at a minimum,” the term “testimonial” includes 
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial[,] and [statements made during] police interrogations.”81
Applying the new categorical approach, the Court concluded 
that the witness’s statements in Crawford were inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause.
 
82  The Court explained that the witness, Sylvia 
Crawford, was read her Miranda warnings and then interrogated twice 
by law enforcement about the involvement of her husband, Michael 
Crawford, in a stabbing.83  Furthermore, Sylvia was unavailable for tri-
al because of the state marital privilege.84  Based on these facts, the 
Court determined that Sylvia’s statements were testimonial and that 
Michael was denied an opportunity to cross-examine her.85  Without 
any additional discussion on what other kinds of situations produce 
testimonial statements, the Court concluded that the admission of 
Sylvia’s statements violated Michael’s right to confrontation.86
 
 76. Id.; cf. supra text accompanying notes 
  Con-
67–70 (describing the two-pronged reliability 
test of Roberts).   
 77. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 79. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
 80. Id. at 51, 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive de-
finition of the term ‘testimonial.’”). 
 81. Id. at 68.  The Court indicated that it “use[d] the term ‘interrogation’ in its collo-
quial, rather than any technical legal, sense.”  Id. at 53 n.4. 
 82. Id. at 68. 
 83. Id. at 38.  According to Michael, he and Sylvia went in search of the victim because 
Michael was upset about an earlier incident in which the victim had attempted to rape Syl-
via.  Id.  A fight ensued when Michael and Sylvia found the victim in his apartment, and 
the victim was stabbed in the torso.  Id.   
 84. Id. at 40.  Generally, under the state marital privilege, a spouse is barred from testi-
fying about the other spouse without that person’s consent.  Id. 
 85. Id. at 68. 
 86. Id. 
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sequently, the Crawford Court moved away from the open-ended re-
liability standard of Roberts, but did not provide a comprehensive de-
finition of the term underlying its new categorical standard of Con-
frontation Clause analysis.  
3.  The United States Supreme Court Provided Further Guidance on 
the Categorical Standard of Confrontation Clause Analysis but 
Failed to Make Clear Whether It Was Crafting a Declarant-
Focused Approach   
The Court provided further direction on what statements are tes-
timonial in Davis v. Washington, and thereby refined the categorical 
approach developed in Crawford.87  The Davis Court directed courts to 
identify the primary purpose of a police interrogation in deciding 
whether the declarant’s statements are testimonial or nontestimoni-
al.88  In applying the primary purpose analysis to the two cases ana-
lyzed in Davis, however, the Court did not make clear whether its 
analysis focused on the declarant, the interrogator, or both.89
In elaborating on the categorical standard established in Craw-
ford, the Davis Court explained that statements made during police 
interrogations are nontestimonial when the “circumstances objective-
ly indicat[e] that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”
   
90  By contrast, 
statements made during police interrogations are testimonial when 
“the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to es-
tablish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal pros-
ecution.”91
The Court attempted to elucidate the primary purpose inquiry by 
identifying the following factors as useful to the analysis: (1) whether 
the declarant is describing events as they are happening; (2) whether 
there is an ongoing emergency; (3) the nature of what is asked by law 
enforcement and answered by the declarant; and (4) the interroga-
   
 
 87. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  The Court decided two separate cases in Davis: State v. 
Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc) and Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 
2005).  Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–21.  The Davis Court’s opinion was written by Justice Scalia.  
Id. at 817.  
 88. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
 89. Compare id. at 823 n.1 (indicating a declarant-focused approach to the primary 
purpose analysis), with id. at 827 (suggesting a combined focus on both the declarant and 
the officers in determining the primary purpose of a police interrogation).   
 90. Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. (emphasis added). 
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tion’s level of formality.92  This type of primary purpose analysis, the 
Court indicated in dicta, should be conducted from the perspective of 
the declarant, and not the perspective of law enforcement.93  Later in 
the opinion, however, the Court noted that in examining the nature 
of the questions asked and answered, it considered the interrogators’ 
motives.94
Still, applying the primary purpose analysis to the two consolidat-
ed cases in Davis, the Court suggested that both the declarant’s intent 
and the interrogators’ motives are relevant considerations in deter-
mining statement admissibility under the Confrontation Clause.  In 
Davis itself, the Court decided that statements made during a 911 call 
were nontestimonial.
  
95  The Court explained that the declarant, Mi-
chelle McCottry, made statements to a 911 emergency operator indi-
cating that she was being assaulted by her former boyfriend, Adrian 
Davis.96  The Court applied the aforementioned factors and decided 
that: (1) McCottry was describing events that were currently happen-
ing; (2) she was facing an ongoing emergency; (3) the nature of what 
was asked and answered was necessary to respond to the ongoing 
emergency; and (4) the interrogation was informal.97  In applying the 
third factor, the Court emphasized how the operator’s questions 
aimed to resolve the ongoing emergency.98  Consequently, despite 
suggesting that the declarant’s intent should form the focus of its 
analysis, the Court took the motives of law enforcement into account 
when determining that the primary purpose of the police interroga-
tion was to respond to an emergency and that the statements at issue 
were nontestimonial.99
 
 92. Id. at 827. 
 
 93. See id. at 823 n.1 (“And of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final 
analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confronta-
tion Clause requires us to evaluate.”).   
 94. See id. at 827 (implying that questions asked by an interrogator may be considered 
in deciding the primary purpose of an encounter). 
 95. Id. at 828–29.   
 96. Id. at 817.  The Court stated that the actions of 911 emergency operators may be 
considered actions by law enforcement for the purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis.  
Id. at 823 n.2.  Therefore, the Court labeled the conversation between McCottry and the 
911 emergency operator an interrogation by law enforcement.  Id. at 826.  
 97. Id. at 827. 
 98. Id.  For example, the Court explained that the operator asked about who was at-
tacking McCottry, so that the police would know whether they were pursuing a “violent 
felon.”  Id.  
 99. Id. at 827–28. 
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Conversely, in Davis’s companion case,100 the Court held that the 
statements made when police responded to a domestic violence dis-
turbance were testimonial.101  The Court explained that when the po-
lice arrived, declarant Amy Hammon was sitting by herself on the 
porch, and her husband, Hershel, was inside the house.102  The police 
kept Amy and Hershel apart while they questioned Amy about what 
had happened.103  Amy eventually told the police that Hershel had at-
tacked her and her daughter.104
The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of the police inter-
rogation was to investigate a crime because: (1) Amy told the police 
what had happened, as opposed to what was happening; (2) there was 
no ongoing emergency; (3) the officer’s questions sought to investi-
gate a past crime; and (4) the interrogation was formal.
 
105  The Court 
focused again on the motives of law enforcement when it determined 
that the officer questioned Amy “not seeking to determine . . . ‘what is 
happening,’ but rather ‘what happened.’”106  Relying once more on 
both the declarant’s intent and the officers’ motives, the Court con-
cluded that Amy’s statements were testimonial and inadmissible un-
der the Confrontation Clause.107
B.  State and Lower Federal Courts Continue to Exercise Considerable 
Discretion as They Decide Whose Perspective Controls the Categorical 
Approach to Confrontation Clause Analysis 
  Taken together, the two consolidat-
ed cases in Davis indicate a focus on the declarant’s intent, but in fact 
take into account the officers’ motives. 
Following Crawford and Davis, state and lower federal courts are 
to apply the categorical approach to Confrontation Clause analysis, 
 
 100. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 101. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829–30. 
 102. Id. at 819. 
 103. Id. at 819–20.  
 104. Id. at 820.  Amy filled out a “battery affidavit,” stating that Hershel “[b]roke our 
[f]urnace &shoved me down on the floor into the broken glass.  Hit me in the chest and 
threw me down.  Broke our lamps &phone.  Tore up my van where I couldn’t leave the 
house.  Attacked my daughter.”  Id. 
 105. Id. at 829–30. 
 106. Id. at 830. 
 107. Id.  Although the Court appeared to draw a firm line when it stated that testimoni-
al statements are inadmissible absent unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination, it retained an exception to this rule.  See id. at 833–34 (discussing the doc-
trine of forfeiture by wrongdoing).  In Giles v. California, the Court explained that the de-
fendant forfeits the right to confrontation when she has engaged in wrongful acts aimed at 
preventing a witness from testifying at trial.  554 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2008) (plurality opi-
nion). 
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under which admissibility is based on whether statements are testi-
monial or nontestimonial.108  Although the Court intended to reduce 
open-ended analysis by developing this categorical approach, state 
and lower federal courts continue to exercise considerable discretion 
and reach divergent results as they decide how to classify state-
ments.109  Relying on incomplete and conflicting directives from the 
Court in Crawford and Davis, state and lower federal courts alternate 
between declarant-focused approaches110 and approaches that con-
sider both the declarant’s intent and the officers’ motives.111
1.  Declarant-Focused Approaches 
   
Some state and lower federal courts apply a declarant-focused 
approach in deciding whether statements are testimonial.112  For ex-
ample, in Raile v. People,113 the Colorado Supreme Court explained 
that, in deciding whether statements are admissible under the Con-
frontation Clause, courts must assume the perspective of a “reasona-
ble declarant.”114  In considering whether the declarant’s statements 
to the police were admissible,115 the court reasoned that, when the 
declarant made her statements, there was no ongoing emergency be-
cause the declarant (1) was in police protection, (2) was not in dan-
ger, and (3) was not asking for help.116  The court determined that 
the declarant’s statements indicated a primary purpose of providing 
information for a later criminal prosecution, were testimonial, and 
their admission violated the defendant’s right to confrontation.117
 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 
   
75–77. 
 109. See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 308–09, 965 A.2d 75, 76–77 (2009) (conclud-
ing that the victim’s statements to the police, made after the officers responded to a do-
mestic disturbance and at the scene of the crime, were testimonial); State v. Shea, 965 A.2d 
504, 505 (Vt. 2008) (facing similar facts as those encountered in Lucas, but deciding that 
the declarant’s statements were nontestimonial). 
 110. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 111. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 112. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (endorsing a dec-
larant-focused approach); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(same); Cuyuch v. State, 667 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ga. 2008) (same); State v. Camarena, 176 P.3d 
380, 387 (Or. 2008) (en banc) (same). 
 113. 148 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2006) (en banc). 
 114. Id. at 133. 
 115. Id. at 128. 
 116. Id. at 133. 
 117. Id.  Despite the court’s conclusion that the defendant’s right to confrontation was 
violated, the court did not reverse the defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 136.  The court de-
cided that the admission of the statements was harmless error because it had a negligible 
impact on the defense.  Id.  
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Similarly, in United States v. Hinton,118 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit suggested that the defendant’s reasona-
ble expectations control whether his statements are testimonial.119  
The declarant in Hinton, Thomas Mack, first made statements to the 
police in a 911 call and later in person when the police arrived at the 
scene of the crime.120  In the 911 call, Mack reported that an un-
known individual had threatened him with a gun.121  When the police 
responded to the call, Mack rode with the officers in their cruiser and 
eventually identified the defendant, Thomas Hinton, as his assai-
lant.122  Reasoning that Mack was seeking the help of the police in 
ending a harrowing experience when he called 911, the court decided 
that Mack’s statements were nontestimonial and admissible.123  By 
contrast, the court determined that, when Mack identified Hinton 
while riding in the police cruiser, Mack was seeking to facilitate the 
officers’ investigation of a crime.124  His identification of Hinton was 
accordingly categorized as inadmissible, testimonial evidence.125
2.  Combined Declarant- and Interrogator-Focused Approaches 
 
A number of state and lower federal courts take both the decla-
rant’s intent and the officers’ motives into account when classifying 
statements as testimonial or nontestimonial.126  For instance, in Wright 
v. State,127 the Indiana Court of Appeals considered both the decla-
rant’s statements and the officers’ questions, and thereby deemed 
both the declarant and the police relevant to Confrontation Clause 
analysis.128  When the police discovered the declarant, R.A., he was 
bleeding profusely from multiple stab wounds.129
 
 118. 423 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2005). 
  In response to an 
officer’s question of who had stabbed him, R.A. identified Sean 
 119. Id. at 360. 
 120. Id. at 356–57.   
 121. Id.   
 122. Id. at 357.  From the police cruiser, Mack pointed to two individuals and stated, 
“There you go.”  Id.   
 123. Id. at 361–62. 
 124. Id. at 361. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (considering 
the perspectives of both the declarant and law enforcement); Belton v. Blaisdell, 559 F. 
Supp. 2d 128, 157 (D.N.H. 2008) (same); State v. Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 
2008) (same); State v. Franklin, S.W.3d 799, 817–18 (Tenn. 2010) (same).  
 127. 916 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. App. 2009). 
 128. Id. at 276–77. 
 129. Id. at 272–73.  
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Wright.130  To decide whether R.A.’s identification of Wright was ad-
missible under the Confrontation Clause, the court examined how 
R.A.’s statements referenced his current injuries and suggested that 
there was an ongoing emergency.131  The court also evaluated the 
purpose of the officers’ questions and determined that their inquiries 
were necessary for resolving the emergency.132  Based on both R.A.’s 
intent and the officers’ motives, the court decided that Wright’s right 
to confrontation was not violated by admitting R.A.’s statements be-
cause the statements were nontestimonial.133
Likewise, in United States v. Arnold,
   
134 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the perspectives of both the 
declarant and the police in determining whether the declarant’s 
statements to the officers were admissible.135  The declarant, Tamica 
Gordon, called 911 and stated that her mother’s boyfriend, Joseph 
Arnold, had pointed a gun at her.136  The police arrived on the scene 
shortly thereafter, and Gordon, visibly upset, told them that Arnold 
was trying to kill her.137  Arnold subsequently returned to the scene 
and, upon his arrival, Gordon identified him as the man who had 
threatened her.138  In examining whether each of Gordon’s state-
ments was admissible, the court considered what Gordon and the of-
ficers knew during their encounter.139  The court reasoned that nei-
ther Gordon nor the officers knew whether Arnold posed a continued 
threat.140  The court further determined that reasonable officers in 
this situation would perceive an emergency because an armed person 
was at large.141  The court concluded that all of Gordon’s statements 
were nontestimonial and that their admission did not violate Arnold’s 
right to confrontation.142
 
 130. Id.  
 
 131. Id. at 276.   
 132. Id. at 276–77. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 486 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 135. Id. at 190. 
 136. Id. at 179.  In addition, Gordon stated that Arnold was a convicted murderer and 
that he had recently been released from prison.  Id. 
 137. Id. at 179–80.  Gordon also described Arnold’s gun as a “black handgun.”  Id. at 
180. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 189–91. 
 140. Id. at 190. 
 141. Id. (“No reasonable officer could arrive at a scene while the victim was still ‘scream-
ing’ and ‘crying’ about a recent threat to her life by an individual who had a gun and who 
was likely still in the vicinity without perceiving that an emergency still existed.”). 
 142. Id. at 193. 
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As these recent Confrontation Clause cases demonstrate, the Su-
preme Court sought to minimize discretionary evaluations of state-
ments’ reliability by introducing a categorical approach in deciding 
whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial.  The Court 
failed, however, to give clear guidance on whether courts need to 
consider the declarant’s intent, the officers’ motives, or both in mak-
ing this determination.  As a result, state and lower federal courts’ de-
cisions regarding statement admissibility under the Confrontation 
Clause continue to be unpredictable. 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Michigan v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court vacated 
the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, holding that the pri-
mary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to respond 
to an ongoing emergency.143  In so holding, the Court concluded that 
Covington’s statements were nontestimonial and that their admission 
did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.144
According to the majority, in order to determine whether Co-
vington’s statements were testimonial and thus subject to the Con-
frontation Clause, the Court had to assess the primary purpose of the 
interrogation by conducting an objective evaluation of the interroga-
tion’s circumstances as well as the parties’ statements and actions.
 
145  
This objective evaluation consisted of a number of factors, including 
the existence of an ongoing emergency,146 the type and scope of the 
emergency,147 the victim’s medical condition,148
 
 143. 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011). 
 and the level of for-
 144. Id. at 1167. 
 145. Id. at 1156.  Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 1149.  Ac-
cording to the Court, the circumstances of an interrogation are “matters of objective fact.”  
Id. at 1156.  To objectively evaluate the parties’ statements and actions, a court must de-
termine the purpose that reasonable individuals would have had in that particular encoun-
ter.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 1157.  The Court reasoned that the existence of an ongoing emergency “fo-
cus[es] an individual’s attention on responding to the emergency,” thereby limiting the 
possibility that the individual is fabricating statements and eliminating the need to subject 
statements made during the emergency to cross-examination.  Id. 
 147. Id. at 1158.  The Court explained that the type and scope of an emergency may 
depend on what kind of weapon is involved.  Id.  For example, when the weapon involved 
is a gun, the emergency may not end when the victim escapes from his assailant because 
the general public continues to face a threat.  Id. at 1158–59. 
 148. Id. at 1159.  The Court stated that the victim’s medical condition is important to 
the primary purpose analysis because “it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any 
purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose 
formed would necessarily be a testimonial one.”  Id.  
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mality of the situation.149  The Court also explained that, in examin-
ing the statements and actions of the parties, both the declarant’s 
statements and the interrogators’ questions should be considered.150
In deciding the case, the Court first examined the circumstances 
of the police interrogation of Covington.
 
151  When the police re-
sponded to the radio dispatch, they lacked important information, in-
cluding who the victim and his attacker were and whether the attacker 
posed a continued threat to the victim or public.152  In addition, Co-
vington’s interrogation did not reveal the shooter’s current location, 
whether the shooting reflected a private dispute, or whether the dan-
ger had ended.153  In the Court’s opinion, the threat did not end 
when Covington fled Bryant’s house because the case involved a 
gun.154  Based on the above circumstances, the Court concluded that 
there was an ongoing emergency because an armed shooter was at 
large, and it was unclear whether the shooter would attack again and, 
if so, who was at risk.155
Next, the Court examined Covington’s and the officers’ state-
ments and actions to determine whether the primary purpose of the 
police interrogation was to respond to the ongoing emergency.
 
156  
Noting that Covington was in pain and that he repeatedly asked the 
police when emergency medical services would arrive, the Court con-
cluded that a reasonable person in Covington’s situation would not 
have had a primary purpose to provide testimony necessary for a later 
criminal prosecution.157
 
 149. Id. at 1160.  The Court explained that, when an interrogation is formal, the impli-
cation is that there is no ongoing emergency.  Id.  However, the fact that an interrogation 
is informal does not necessarily imply that there is an ongoing emergency.  Id. 
  In turn, in examining the statements and ac-
tions of the police, the Court focused on the officers’ questions, 
 150. Id.  The Court referred to its focus on both the declarant and the interrogator as a 
“combined approach.”  Id. at 1161.  The Court rejected the argument that Davis v. Wash-
ington demands a declarant-focused approach, stating that “[t]he language in the footnote 
[in Davis] was not meant to determine how the courts are to assess the nature of the decla-
rant’s purpose, but merely to remind readers that it is the statements, and not the ques-
tions, that must be evaluated under the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 1160–61 n.11.  In addi-
tion, the Court believed that a combined approach would resolve the ambiguities that 
arise from only considering one party’s perspective.  Id. at 1161. 
 151. Id. at 1163. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1163–64.  
 154. Id. at 1164. 
 155. Id.  The Court stated that the emergency did not continue until Bryant was ar-
rested a year later, but declined to identify exactly when the emergency terminated.  Id. at 
1164–65. 
 156. Id. at 1165–66. 
 157. Id. at 1165. 
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which assessed the nature of the threat.158  Given the evaluative nature 
of the questions, the Court determined that the police sought the in-
formation necessary for the ongoing emergency response.159
Finally, the Court considered the informality of Covington’s in-
terrogation, which was conducted in a public place and concluded 
with the arrival of emergency medical services.
 
160  The Court reasoned 
that the informal nature of the interrogation implied that its primary 
purpose was to cope with the ongoing emergency.161  Based on an ex-
amination of the interrogation’s circumstances as well as the parties’ 
statements and actions, the Court concluded that Covington’s state-
ments to the police were nontestimonial and that the admission of 
these statements did not violate Bryant’s right to confrontation.162
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed that the admis-
sion of Covington’s statements to the police did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause, yet he criticized the majority’s primary purpose 
analysis.
 
163  Justice Thomas argued that the primary purpose analysis 
creates uncertainty for law enforcement and lower courts and results 
in unpredictable decisions.164  He contended that the better approach 
would be to analyze the extent to which an interrogation resembles 
practices that the Confrontation Clause historically sought to elimi-
nate.165  Consequently, because the police interrogation of Covington 
was highly informal, Justice Thomas found that the interrogation did 
not represent the kind of practice that the Confrontation Clause his-
torically addressed, and Covington’s statements were admissible at tri-
al.166
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Covington’s statements were 
testimonial and that the majority distorted Confrontation Clause juri-
sprudence by deciding otherwise.
 
167
 
 158. Id. at 1165–66.  The Court insisted that it did not attach “controlling weight” to the 
officers’ motives in an interrogation.  Id. at 1162.  Instead, “the declarant’s statements, not 
the interrogator’s questions . . . must . . . pass the Sixth Amendment test.”  Id.  The Court 
asserted, however, that in deciding whether statements are testimonial, “courts should look 
to all of the relevant circumstances,” and the interrogator constitutes such a relevant con-
sideration.  Id. 
  First, he criticized the majority’s 
focus on the declarant’s intent and the interrogators’ motives and as-
 159. Id. at 1166. 
 160. Id. at 1160, 1166.  
 161. Id. at 1166. 
 162. Id. at 1166–67. 
 163. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1167–68. 
 167. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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serted that the declarant’s intent is what matters.168  Examining the 
interrogation from Covington’s perspective, Justice Scalia concluded 
that Covington knew there was no ongoing threat from his attacker 
and that he intended to provide the police with statements necessary 
for Bryant’s eventual prosecution.169
Second, Justice Scalia claimed the majority erred by concluding 
that there was an ongoing emergency when the police questioned Co-
vington.
  
170  In Justice Scalia’s view, because most murders involve only 
one victim, it was unlikely that Covington’s attacker posed a contin-
ued threat to the police or public.171  Finally, Justice Scalia argued 
that the majority returned to discredited standards of Confrontation 
Clause analysis by requiring judges to conduct open-ended evalua-
tions of the totality of the circumstances and to consider the reliability 
of a declarant’s statements to determine their admissibility at trial.172
Justice Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that Covington’s state-
ments to the police were testimonial.
   
173  Agreeing with Justice Scalia, 
Justice Ginsburg asserted that the declarant’s intent should govern 
the analysis, and not the interrogators’ motives.174  In addition, Justice 
Ginsburg briefly noted that, if the issue had been presented in this 
case, she would have addressed the question of whether dying decla-
rations are subject to the Confrontation Clause.175
 
 168. Id. at 1168–69.  In Justice Scalia’s view, for a statement to be deemed testimonial, 
“the declarant must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an un-
considered or offhand remark; and he must make the statement with the understanding 
that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the accused.”  Id.  
The interrogators’ motives do not indicate how the declarant thought his words would be 
used.  Id. at 1169.   
 
 169. Id. at 1170.  Justice Scalia also contended that, even considering the officers’ mo-
tives, “this is an absurdly easy case.”  Id. at 1171.  The Justice explained that the officers’ 
actions at the gas station indicated that they did not perceive a threat from Covington’s 
attacker: they neither drew their weapons nor searched the premises for the shooter.  Id. 
 170. Id. at 1172. 
 171. Id. at 1172–73. 
 172. Id. at 1175.  Justice Scalia noted that “[t]he only virtue of the Court’s approach (if 
it can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach the ‘fairest’ result under 
the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. at 1170.  Justice Scalia criticized this outcome, ar-
guing that, under the majority’s approach, a defendant’s right to confrontation is vulnera-
ble to being ignored.  Id. 
 173. Id. at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id.  Justice Ginsburg further agreed with Justice Scalia that the majority’s decision 
created confusion in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.  Id. at 1176–77. 
 175. Id. at 1177. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Michigan v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the primary purpose of the police interrogation of Covington was to 
respond to an ongoing emergency.176  Based on this determination, 
the Court concluded that Covington’s statements were nontestimoni-
al and that their admission did not violate Bryant’s right to confronta-
tion.177  The Court’s combined focus on the declarant’s intent and the 
officers’ motives was a likely result of the incomplete and contradicto-
ry directives of Crawford and Davis.178  The Court erred by focusing on 
both the declarant and the police because this standard promotes a 
discretionary analysis that leaves defendants’ rights to confrontation 
insufficiently protected.179  Instead of examining both the declarant’s 
intent and the officers’ motives, the Court should have developed a 
declarant-focused approach, and thereby secured defendants’ rights 
to confront the witnesses against them.180
A. The Bryant Court’s Combined Focus Was a Likely Result of the 
Incomplete and Contradictory Directives of Crawford and Davis 
   
The Court’s combined focus on the declarant’s intent and the of-
ficers’ motives was a predictable result of the incomplete and contra-
dictory directives given in Crawford and Davis.  As the Court laid down 
a new standard of Confrontation Clause analysis in Crawford, it mista-
kenly failed to provide an adequately thorough definition of its key 
term, “testimonial.”181  Just two years later, in Davis, the Court offered 
additional guidance on defining “testimonial,” yet still left ambiguity 
in the application of the categorical standard.182
 
 176. Id. at 1166–67 (majority opinion). 
  The Bryant Court, 
forced to maneuver the gaps and ambiguities established by Crawford 
and Davis, responded with a combined focus on the declarant and the 
 177. Id. at 1167. 
 178. See infra Part.IV.A. 
 179. See infra Part IV.B. 
 180. See infra Part IV.C. 
 181. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (declining to define the term 
“testimonial”). 
 182. Compare Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (explaining that whether 
statements are testimonial depends on the primary purpose of the police-citizen encoun-
ter without indicating whose perspective should dictate the primary purpose of the inter-
rogation), with id. at 823 n.1 (stating that “it is in the final analysis the declarant’s state-
ments, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to 
evaluate”).  
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officers that reasonably followed from precedent183 but was unfore-
seen by Justice Scalia,184 the author of those earlier opinions.185
The Bryant Court applied a categorical standard that lacked a 
clear definition of the term “testimonial.”  Although legal scholars 
considered Crawford a major shift in Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence,
 
186 the Court’s refusal to provide a comprehensive definition of 
“testimonial” resulted in uncertainty.187  Equipped only with the few 
core examples of testimonial statements identified in Crawford,188 state 
and lower federal courts confronted situations that did not fit into any 
of Crawford’s limited practices.189  As a result, many courts reached di-
vergent conclusions as they grappled with these unusual situations.190
The Court’s failure to provide a more complete definition of 
“testimonial” not only led to confusion among other courts, but also 
opened the door for a later Court to significantly alter how the term 
would be understood.
   
191
 
 183. See id. at 827 (suggesting that both the declarant’s intent and the interrogators’ 
motives are relevant considerations in determining the primary purpose of an interroga-
tion); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (declining to define the term “testimonial,” and thereby 
leaving ambiguity in Confrontation Clause analysis). 
  Indeed, in an effort to offer additional guid-
ance on defining “testimonial,” the Court in Davis developed an en-
 184. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1174 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The 
Court’s decision in Bryant] is a gross distortion of the law . . . .”). 
 185. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
 186. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm, Jerome E. Deise & John R. Grimm, The Confrontation 
Clause and the Hearsay Rule: What Hearsay Exceptions Are Testimonial?, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 155, 
157 (2010) (explaining that “Crawford shifted the touchstone of admissibility from a state-
ment’s reliability to its testimonial nature”); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Note, Crawford’s Aftershock: 
Aligning the Regulation of Nontestimonial Hearsay with the History and Purposes of the Confronta-
tion Clause, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (2008) (“Courts have called the decision a ‘bomb-
shell,’ a ‘renaissance,’ and the dawning of a ‘new day’ in the Sixth Amendment’s Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence.”).     
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing how, 
because the Crawford Court did not provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” it 
is unclear what are the “determinative” characteristics of testimonial statements). 
 188. The Crawford Court stated that, “at a minimum,” testimonial evidence includes 
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial[,] and 
[statements made during] police interrogations.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 189. See, e.g., Saget, 377 F.3d at 228–29 (finding that a declarant’s statements to an in-
formant, whose identity is unknown to the declarant, are testimonial under Crawford even 
though these circumstances were not identified in that case).  But see United States v. Hin-
ton, 423 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that some of the statements at issue were 
nontestimonial because they did not fit into any of the categories articulated by Crawford). 
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
 191. At oral argument in Bryant, Justice Breyer, who joined the Court’s opinion in Craw-
ford, 541 U.S. at 37, admitted that he “did not foresee the scope of Crawford.”  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 54, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150), 2010 WL 
3907894. 
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tirely new test to categorize statements made in response to a police 
interrogation.192  The Davis Court explained that the primary purpose 
of a police interrogation may dictate whether statements are testi-
monial.193  While the primary purpose test was a helpful expansion of 
the Crawford Court’s minimal construction of “testimonial” and fit eas-
ily into the categorical framework, it demonstrated the open-
endedness of the categorical standard and its ability to be easily ma-
nipulated.194
Additionally, the Davis Court did little to rectify the ambiguity of 
the categorical standard established in Crawford.  In elaborating on 
the categorical standard, the Davis Court provided conflicting instruc-
tions on the perspective from which the primary purpose test should 
be conducted.  In footnote 1 of Davis, the Court indicated that the 
declarant’s intent—and not the interrogators’ motives—is what mat-
ters when determining the primary purpose of an interrogation and, 
accordingly, statement admissibility under the Confrontation 
Clause.
   
195  While identifying factors to elucidate the primary purpose 
test, however, the Court opened up the analysis to the kinds of ques-
tions asked by law enforcement.196  By incorporating law enforce-
ment’s questions into the primary purpose test, the Bryant Court sug-
gested that the interrogators’ motives are relevant considerations,197
 
 192. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (determining that statements 
“are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing 
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”). 
 
and undermined its previous suggestion that the declarant’s intent is 
what matters. 
 193. Id.  For a detailed discussion of Davis’s primary purpose test, see supra text accom-
panying notes 87–91.  
 194. See Michael D. Cicchini, Judicial (In)Discretion: How Courts Circumvent the Confronta-
tion Clause Under Crawford and Davis, 75 TENN. L. REV. 753, 765, (2008) (describing Davis 
as providing a “potentially workable framework,” despite eventually concluding that it has 
not lived up to this potential); id. at 778 (arguing that Crawford and Davis created a broad 
and easily manipulated test for statement admissibility under the Confrontation Clause); 
Grimm et al., supra note 186, at 158 (“Davis developed Crawford’s inchoate definition of 
‘testimonial’ . . . .”). 
 195. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.1 (“[I]t is in the final analysis the declarant’s state-
ments, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to eva-
luate.”).   
 196. See id. at 827 (examining the nature of the interrogators’ questions).  
 197. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160–61 (2011) (suggesting that, because 
Davis mandates the examination of the nature of interrogators’ questions, Davis requires 
consideration of the interrogators’ primary purpose). 
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The Bryant Court, acknowledging that Davis provided confusing 
directives on whose perspective controls the categorical analysis,198 de-
termined that both the declarant’s intent and the interrogators’ mo-
tives are pertinent in determining the primary purpose of an interro-
gation.199  Although Justice Scalia disparaged the majority’s combined 
approach as unsupported by precedent,200 the Bryant Court drew on 
the Davis Court’s conflicting directives as evidence that both the dec-
larant and the interrogators must be taken into account when decid-
ing statement admissibility.201  Specifically, the Bryant Court focused 
on Davis’s examination of both the declarant’s statements and the in-
terrogators’ questions and reasoned that Davis requires such a com-
bined approach.202  Having made this determination, the Bryant Court 
then denied that footnote one of Davis mandates an exclusively decla-
rant-focused approach.203
 
 198. See id. at 1160 n.11 (“Some portions of Davis . . . have caused confusion about 
whether the inquiry [into whether a statement is testimonial] prescribes examination of 
one participant to the exclusion of the other.”).  Commentators have come to different 
conclusions about Davis’s instructions for whose perspective should control the primary 
purpose analysis.  See, e.g., Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic 
Approach to Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U.  L. REV. 729, 
787 (2008) (explaining Davis’s “objective analysis” of the encounter’s primary purpose 
“from the perspective of a reasonable third party who is unrelated to the incident”); And-
rew Dylan, Note, Working Through the Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1905, 1937 (2007) (stating that, after Davis, “lower courts should feel 
free” to consider the perspectives of both the declarant and the police); Thomas M. For-
syth, III, Note, Just Don’t Say You Heard It from Me: Bridging the Davis v. Washington Divide of 
Indistinguishable Primary-Purpose Statements, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263, 275 (2008) (as-
serting that “[t]he Davis text itself” supports a declarant-focused approach). 
  In other words, the Bryant Court relied on 
what the Davis Court did, as opposed to what the Davis Court said, in 
concluding that a court must conduct a combined inquiry.  Justice 
Scalia therefore overlooked how Davis, an opinion that followed from 
 199. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (“Davis requires a combined inquiry that accounts for 
both the declarant and the interrogator.”). 
 200. See id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Bryant “distorts our Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence”). 
 201. See id. at 1160 (majority opinion) (reasoning that both the declarant and his inter-
rogators are relevant considerations in the primary purpose analysis based on the Davis 
Court’s instruction to consider the nature of the declarant’s statements and the interroga-
tors’ questions). 
 202. Id.  
 203. See id. at 1160–61 n.11 (“The language in the footnote was not meant to determine 
how the courts are to assess the nature of the declarant’s purpose, but merely to remind 
readers that it is the statements, and not the questions, that must be evaluated under the 
Sixth Amendment.”).  
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the open-ended analysis established in Crawford, contributed to the 
Bryant Court’s decision to use a combined focus.204
B.  The Bryant Court Erred by Examining the Intent of the Declarant and 
the Motives of the Police Because This Standard Establishes a 
Discretionary Analysis That Provides Insufficient Protection of 
Defendants’ Rights to Confrontation 
  
The Court erred by considering both the declarant’s intent and 
the officers’ motives because this approach facilitates a discretionary 
standard and thereby offers minimal protection of defendants’ rights 
to confront the witnesses against them.  Although the Court stated 
that it relied on a “combined inquiry,”205 the Court was unclear 
whether, depending on the circumstances, one perspective may be 
weighed more heavily than another.206  By allowing the categorical 
analysis to emphasize the perspective of the declarant, the police, or 
both, the Court ensured a return to a discretionary Confrontation 
Clause analysis akin to that of the reliability standard under Ohio v. 
Roberts.207  Similar to the Roberts reliability test, the discretionary stan-
dard established by Bryant creates an unstable framework in which 
state and lower federal courts may reach virtually any conclusion de-
pending on which perspective they choose to focus.208
 
 204. See id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court’s current decision, 
and not any earlier approach to Confrontation Clause analysis, has muddied the law).  Jus-
tice Scalia’s astonishment over the Bryant Court’s combined approach is especially surpris-
ing given that a number of state and lower federal courts had already come to similar con-
clusions about how to conduct the primary purpose analysis and, accordingly, categorize 
statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial.  See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 486 
F.3d 117, 190 (6th Cir. 2007) (utilizing a combined inquiry in classifying the declarant’s 
statements); State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 817–18 (Tenn. 2010) (same).  But see Unit-
ed States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005) (employing a declarant-focused ap-
proach); Cuyuch v. State, 667 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ga. 2008) (same). 
   
 205. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160, 1166–67 (majority opinion). 
 206. See id. at 1158 (explaining that the determination of whether an emergency exists, 
for the purpose of categorizing statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial, is a 
“highly context-dependent inquiry”). 
 207. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 66–70 (discussing the Roberts test).  The Crawford Court ex-
plained that “[t]he framework [under Roberts] is so unpredictable that it fails to provide 
meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62–
63. 
 208. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The only virtue of the Court’s 
approach (if it can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach the ‘fairest’ 
result under the totality of the circumstances.  If the dastardly police trick a declarant into 
giving an incriminating statement against a sympathetic defendant, a court can focus on 
the police’s intent and declare the statement testimonial.  If the defendant ‘deserves’ to go 
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A critical flaw of the Bryant decision is that the Court did not 
make clear whether, depending on the circumstances, the declarant’s 
intent may be emphasized over police motives or vice versa.  Despite 
the fact that after Davis many state and lower federal courts were al-
ready applying the primary purpose test inconsistently by emphasizing 
one perspective over another,209 Bryant has left the right to confronta-
tion in an even more precarious position than it occupied under Da-
vis.  Whereas before Bryant a combined focus might have been im-
plied from Davis’s confusing directives, now it is mandated by the 
terms of Bryant.210
The Bryant Court expressly stated that Confrontation Clause 
analysis is “highly context-dependent”
   
211 and that “courts should look 
to all of the relevant circumstances” in determining whether a decla-
rant’s statements are testimonial.212  Thus, Bryant freed state and low-
er federal courts to consider anything “relevant” in deciding whether 
statements are admissible at trial.213  Under the guise of “relevance,” 
state and lower federal courts may use their discretion to focus the 
analysis on factors emphasizing the perspective of the declarant, law 
enforcement, or both.214
In allowing courts to continue making discretionary decisions of 
which perspective matters, the Court guaranteed a return to the un-
predictability that characterized the Roberts era.
  
215  The declarant and 
the officers often have very different perspectives in a police interro-
gation.216
 
to jail, then a court can focus on whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning 
hearsay nontestimonial.”). 
  As Justice Scalia recognized in Bryant, the perspective from 
which an interrogation is analyzed has a significant impact on wheth-
 209. See, e.g., Arnold, 486 F.3d at 190 (utilizing a combined approach, but emphasizing 
the officers’ motives by examining what the officers knew at various points throughout the 
police interrogation). 
 210. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (majority opinion) (“Davis requires a combined inquiry 
that accounts for both the declarant and the interrogator.” (emphasis added)). 
 211. Id. at 1158. 
 212. Id. at 1162. 
 213. Id.; see also supra note 208. 
 214. See, e.g., Cuyuch v. State, 667 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ga. 2008) (using a declarant-focused 
approach).  But see United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (using a 
combined approach). 
 215.  For a discussion of the flaws of Roberts, see supra Part II.A.2. 
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting 
that, although the police may have had a primary purpose to investigate a crime, the dec-
larant did not have the same purpose); Raile v. People, 148 P.3d 126, 133 (Colo. 2006) (en 
banc) (acknowledging that the police officer might have perceived an ongoing emergen-
cy, but that, from the perspective of the declarant, there was none). 
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er the declarant’s statements during that interrogation are deemed 
testimonial or nontestimonial.217
By facilitating discretionary determinations of which perspective 
is controlling, the Court created a standard whereby state and lower 
federal courts can obtain virtually any result from a set of facts.  This 
discretionary and unpredictable approach to Confrontation Clause 
analysis, as Justice Scalia recognized, leaves defendants’ rights vulner-
able to judicial override.
   
218  Upon a determination that statements are 
nontestimonial, state and lower federal courts may deprive defen-
dants of the opportunity for cross-examination,219 which is a critical 
tool for examining testimony and exposing its faults.220  In the ab-
sence of cross-examination, defendants may be prosecuted or con-
victed on the basis of evidence that is neither truthful nor accurate.221  
Instead of elevating defendants’ confrontation rights from the vul-
nerable position they held after Davis, the Bryant Court relegated 
these rights to the discretion of state and lower federal courts, render-
ing these rights as easily ignored as they were under the reliability 
standard of Roberts.222
 
 217. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Richard D. Friedman, Grap-
pling with the Meaning of “Testimonial,” 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 255 (2005) (implying that 
the perspective from which an interrogation is considered has an effect on the outcome of 
the analysis). 
 
 218. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 219. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“The Roberts test allows a jury 
to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determina-
tion of reliability.  It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing re-
liability with a wholly foreign one.”). 
 220. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (explaining that, when the 
defendant cross-examines a witness, he “has an opportunity not only of testing the recol-
lection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling [the witness] to stand 
face to face with the jury in order that they may . . . judge . . . whether he is worthy of be-
lief”); see also Scott G. Stewart, Note, The Right of Confrontation, Ongoing Emergencies, and the 
Violent-Perpetrator-at-Large Problem, 61 STAN. L. REV. 751, 762 (2008) (explaining that cross-
examination has been described by legal scholars as essential for determining the truth-
fulness of witnesses’ testimony). 
 221. See John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How Crawford v. Washington De-
nies Defendants a Consistent Confrontation Right, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 209–10 (2011) 
(highlighting the importance of the truth-seeking function of cross-examination for both 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements); Smith, supra note 186, at 1518–19 (explaining 
how cross-examination allows the defendant to test the witness’s memory and perception 
as well as her credibility); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“Dispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a de-
fendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”). 
 222. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63–64 (explaining that courts under Roberts decided the 
reliability of statements through subjective determinations of what factors are most impor-
tant and that this discretionary standard led to abuse of defendants’ confrontation rights).  
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C.  Rather than Rely on a Combined Focus, the Bryant Court Should 
Have Created a Declarant-Focused Approach That More Consistently 
Safeguards Defendants’ Rights to Confront Witnesses  
Instead of employing a combined focus on both the declarant’s 
intent and the officers’ motives, the Court should have created a dec-
larant-focused approach that is better equipped to safeguard defen-
dants’ confrontation rights.  By stipulating what perspective state and 
lower federal courts should assume in determining whether a decla-
rant’s statements are testimonial, the Court would have eliminated 
much of the discretionary analysis that goes into determining whose 
perspective controls.223  The Court also would have reduced the un-
predictability caused by attempting to identify the motives of law en-
forcement.224  In reducing discretionary decisions and making the 
analysis more consistent, the Court would have more adequately pro-
tected defendants’ confrontation rights from judicial override and 
thereby ensured defendants’ opportunity for cross-examination.225
If the Court had directed state and lower federal courts to use a 
declarant-focused approach, it would have prevented discretionary 
decisions of which perspective determines whether a declarant’s 
statements are testimonial.  Limited to the intent of the declarant, 
courts would be unable to choose the perspective that yields the de-
sired outcome.
  
226
In providing state and lower federal courts with a declarant-
focused approach, the Court also would have simplified the categori-
cal standard by reducing the uncertainty caused by determining the 
primary purpose of the police.  When the police respond to an emer-
gency, they nearly always have dual motives of investigating a crime 
and responding to an urgent situation.
  By preventing courts from reaching any conclusion 
on a given set of facts, the Court would have guaranteed that defen-
dants’ confrontation rights are not overridden at courts’ whims and 
that defendants are not improperly denied the opportunity for cross-
examination of witnesses.   
227
 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 
  Justice Thomas noted that 
215–217. 
 224. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (referring to the process of discerning the primary motive 
of the police as “an exercise in fiction”). 
 225. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggest-
ing that open-ended tests in which judges make subjective determinations of statement 
admissibility do not adequately protect defendants’ confrontation rights). 
 226. See id. at 1170 (explaining that, under the majority’s approach, courts can choose 
the perspective they wish to focus on, and thereby obtain the preferred outcome). 
 227. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (“In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime, 
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assigning one of these motives primacy “requires constructing a hie-
rarchy of purpose that will rarely be present—and is not reliably dis-
cernible.”228
An example of the combined approach in application will dem-
onstrate its decreased ability to protect defendants’ confrontation 
rights, as compared with the proposed declarant-focused inquiry.  In 
Wright v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals used a combined ap-
proach to conclude that the declarant’s statements were nontesti-
monial and that their admission did not run afoul of the Confronta-
tion Clause.
  By eliminating the perspective of the police as a consid-
eration, the Court would have protected defendants’ rights to 
confrontation—and therefore their opportunities for cross-
examination—from inconsistent judgments of officers’ motives.  
229  The court examined the officers’ perspective, focusing 
on how the officers were awaiting the homicide unit when they inter-
rogated the declarant and that they did not know whether the defen-
dant posed a continued danger.230  By contrast, the court’s considera-
tion of the declarant’s perspective was limited to the observation of 
the “immediacy of [his] injuries.”231
Based on the facts of Wright, the court could have just as easily 
implemented its combined inquiry to reach an entirely different con-
clusion.  Having received a phone call from the declarant’s neighbor 
that someone was outside her front door calling for help, the police 
were on scene to investigate a potential crime.
   
232  The police behavior 
on the scene did not indicate that the officers feared the declarant’s 
attacker would return.233  The police did not search the area for the 
assailant, but rather proceeded to question the declarant.234  From the 
declarant’s perspective, he had fled his attacker and was now in police 
protection.235
 
whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an interroga-
tion, viewed from the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency situa-
tion and to gather evidence.” (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984))). 
  Taken together, the above considerations suggest—
counter to the court’s decision—that there was no ongoing emergen-
 228. Id.  But see Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 (majority opinion) (stating that “[t]he com-
bined approach . . . ameliorates problems that could arise from looking solely to one par-
ticipant”). 
 229. 916 N.E.2d 269, 276–77 (Ind. App. 2009); see also Part II.B.2.  
 230. Wright, 916 N.E.2d at 276–77.  
 231. Id. at 276. 
 232. Id. at 272. 
 233. Id. at 272–73.   
 234. Id.; cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171–72 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that there was no ongoing emergency where the officers all questioned the decla-
rant before conducting a search of the gas station). 
 235. Wright, 916 N.E.2d at 272–73. 
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cy and that the police aimed to obtain information for a later criminal 
prosecution.  Accordingly, the court could have reasonably deter-
mined that the declarant’s statements were inadmissible, testimonial 
evidence. 
Restricting analysis of Wright to the intent of the declarant leads 
to a clearer answer about whether the declarant’s statements may be 
admitted.  Having escaped his attacker and found refuge in police 
protection, the declarant referenced past events in telling law en-
forcement how he sustained his injuries.236  Viewed objectively, the 
declarant did not provide information to the police to end an attack 
and resolve an ongoing emergency.237
The additional safeguards of the declarant-focused approach may 
provide the difference between acquittal and conviction.
  Based on this conclusion, the 
declarant’s statements were testimonial and should not have been 
admitted, absent a prior opportunity for cross-examination by the de-
fendant.  Consequently, the declarant-focused approach prevents the 
admission of statements that a combined approach allows into evi-
dence, thereby demonstrating the added protection that the former 
standard offers defendants. 
238  The exer-
cise of the confrontation right, as explained earlier, ensures an op-
portunity for cross-examination.239  Cross-examination, in turn, allows 
the defendant to expose critical flaws in the evidence against him.240  
By revealing gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence, the defendant 
may introduce a reasonable doubt of his guilt and defeat the case 
against him.241
 
 236. Id.  Contra Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (explaining that the dec-
larant faced imminent danger when describing domestic abuse simultaneously with its oc-
currence). 
  The right to confrontation affords the defendant a 
 237. Although the declarant was certainly suffering from serious injuries, the declarant’s 
statements did not provide the information necessary for the police to assess the nature of 
his wounds or provide first aid.  The declarant’s statement that “Sean” had stabbed him in 
no way aided the administration of medical care but instead provided essential informa-
tion for a criminal investigation.  Wright, 916 N.E.2d at 273.  For additional facts of Wright, 
see Part II.B.2. 
 238. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (suggesting that, in barring 
statements under the Confrontation Clause, the defendant may avoid conviction). 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 219–221. 
 240. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43 (explaining the truth-seeking function of cross-
examination); see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 
501 (2006) (highlighting the potential of cross-examination to test the evidence against 
the accused and to uncover the truth). 
 241. See, e.g., Josephine Ross, What’s Reliability Got to Do with the Confrontation Clause After 
Crawford?, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 383, 396–97 (2009) (providing an example where cross-
examination might have uncovered flaws in a witness’s testimony and resulted in the jury 
doubting the reliability of his statements).   
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chance to uncover the weaknesses of the prosecution’s case, and me-
rits the increased safeguards provided by the declarant-focused ap-
proach, as compared with the inadequate protection offered by the 
Bryant Court’s combined focus on the declarant and his interrogators. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Michigan v. Bryant, the Court determined that Covington’s 
statements to the police were nontestimonial and beyond the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause because they were obtained through an in-
terrogation aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency.242  The Court’s 
combined focus on both the declarant and the interrogators to cate-
gorize Covington’s statements as nontestimonial followed from the 
Court’s incomplete and contradictory directives in Crawford and Da-
vis.243  The Court therefore backed itself into a combined inquiry that 
enables state and lower federal courts to obtain virtually any result on 
a given set of facts and fails to adequately guarantee defendants’ con-
frontation rights.244  Rather than rely upon a combined focus on the 
declarant and the officers, the Court should have developed a decla-
rant-focused approach that restricts discretionary analysis and protects 
defendants’ rights to confront the witnesses against them.245
 
 
 
 242. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166–67 (2011) (majority opinion). 
 243. See supra Part IV.A. 
 244. See supra Part IV.B. 
 245. See supra Part IV.C. 
